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*  This  paper  is  a  revised  version  of  an  earlier  draft  prepared  in
June  1989.  I  would  like  to  thank  David  Card,  Avinash  )ixit,  Gene
Grossman,  Zvi  Griliches,  Ramon  Lopez,  John  Newman,  Duncan  Thomas,  Jim
Tybout,  Jaime  de  Melo,  and  John  Page  for  helpful  comments  and
suggestions.  This  paper  was  prepared  under  funding  from  the  World  Bank
research  project  "Industrial  Competition,  Productive  Efficiency,  and
Their  Relation  to Trade  Regimes  (RPO 674-46).Theoretical  arguments  for  the  gains  from  trade  have traditionally  rested
on the  concept  of allocative  efficiency.  In an open  economy  with unrestricted
trade,  resources  are  more likely  to be allocated  in  areas  where  a country  has
a  comparative  advantage.  The  recent  emphasis  on  imperfectly  competitive  markets
in  international  trade  creates  yet  another  argument  for  the  welfare  benefits  of
free  trade:  in  a  protected  market  dominated  by several  firms,  trade  reform  will
lead  to increased  competition.  1/
Despite the consensus  on the theoretical  benefits  of free trade, the
empirical  evidence  is  often  inconclusive.  The-e  is  little  evidence  linking  trade
reform  with  increased  competition,  particularly  for  developing  countries.  Since
most studies  on trade  reform  use aggregate  data  across  sectors  or countries,
these  cannot  capture  changes  in  behavior  at the  individual  firm  level.  2/ Such
studies  typically  analyze  the  effects  of trade  reform  on  behavior  indirectly  by
addressing  such  issues  as sectoral  growth  before  and  after  the  reforms.
Even  more  surprising  is  the  lack  of  definitive  evidence  linking  trade  reform
and productivity  growth.  Several  recent  overviews  of the links  between  trade
regimes  and  productivity  growth  (Bhagwati  (1988),  Havrylyshyn  (1987),  Nishimizu
and Page (1987))  suggest  that the evidence  is mixed.  As an illustratior.,  we
contrast  Nishimizu  and Robinson  (1984)  with Nishimizu  and Page (1987).  The
earlier  study  finds  a  negative  correlation  between  productivity  growth  and  the
degree  of import  substitution  in four  developing  economies.  The later  study,
which covers  a different  time period  and a more extended  set of countries,
reverses  the  earlier  finding.
One  possible  explanation  for  the  lack  of  conclusive  results  may  depend  on
how  productivity  is  measured.  The  measurement  of  productivity  pioneered  by  Solow
(1957)  has been used extensively  to analyze technological  change in both
1developing  and developed  countries.  Solow derived a  productivity  measare,
refarred  to as total  or  multi-factor  productivity  (TFP),  which  depends  on the
assumption  that  product  markets  are  perfectly  competitive.  Yet shifts  in  trade
policy are  likely to alter the  competitive  environment,  particularly  in
developing  countries  where domestic  markets  are  often small  and dominated  by
several  firms.
Although  the  potential  biases  from  assuming  perfect  competition  have long
been  recognized  (see  Nishimizu  (1979)),  this  paper  implements  a  simple  approach
to correct TFP estimates  for these biases. Recent papers by Robert Hall
(1986,1988)  and  Domowitz,  Hubbard,  and  Petersen  (1988)  derive  a  methodology  which
allows  them  to  account  for  market  power  when  estimating  productivity.  By  relaxing
the assumption  that firms  set price  equal  to marginal  cost,  Hall shows  that
previous  estimates  of  productivity  were  spuriously  procyclical.  Domowitz,  Hubbard
and Petersen  (1988)  extend  Hall's  analysis  to allow for  material  inputs  and
changing  price-cost  margins  over  time,  then  apply  their  methodology  to aggregate
industry  data.
In  this  paper,  we extend  these  earlier  approaches  to  analyze  changes  in  firm
behavior  and  productivity  during  trade  liberalization  in  the  Cote  d'Ivoire.  For
a  panel  of 287  firms,  we estimate  market  power  before  and  after  a trade  reform
implemented  in  1985.  Our  results  suggest  that  price-cost  margins  fell  in  a  number
of sectors  following  the  reform.  However,  since  the reform  was accompanied  by
a real  appreciation  in the  exchange  rate,  part  of the  fall  in  margins  was  also
due to the conjunction  of the trade reform  with the adverse  exchange  rate
movement.
When productivity  estimates  are  modified  to account  for  changes  in  price-
cost  margins  over  the  period,  the  positive  correlation  between  trade  reform  and
2productivity  is strengthened  in some sectors  and reversed  in others.  These
results  suggest  that  conclusions  based  on  traditional  productivity  estimates  are
extremely  sensitive  to the  assumptions  about  firm  behavior. Section  I  outlines-
the theoretical  approach  and  shows  how ignoring  the  effects  of l'beralization
on  competition  may  lead  researchers  to  mismeasure  the  effect  of trade  rgform  on
productivity.  Section  II discusses  trade  policy  changes  in the  Cote  d'Ivoire
and  briefly  describes  the  data. We present  estimation  results  in Section  III.
Section  IV explores  the sensitivity  of productivity  measures  to alternative
specifications,  including  the  possibility  that  the  technology  is  characterized
by  increasing  returns  to  scale.  Final., in  Section  V  we incorporate  our  findings
on  market  power  to  derive  modified ?!P  estimates.
I. The  Bias  in Productivity  Measurement
Our  framework  extends  Hall  (1986,1988)  and  Domowitz,  Hubbard  and  Petersen
(1988).  We begin  with  a production  function  for  firm  i in
industry  j at time  t:
Yijt  =  Ajt  efit  G(Lijt 9 Kijt,Mijt)  (1)
Output  Yijt  is  produced  by firm  i  with inputs  labor  L,  capital  K,  and  materials
M.  Ajt  is  an industry-specific  index  of  Hicks-neutral  technical  progress,  while
fit  is  a  firm-specific  parameter  which  allows  for  differences  in  firm  technology.
In our estimation, we will want to identify  industry-wide  productivity  A.
Totally  differentiating  (1),  and  dividing  through  by Y,  we have
dY  8Y dL  8Y dK  8Y  dM  dA
- i,  '  --  iit  + - - ijt  +  - - ijt +  - jt +  fi  (2)
Y  J  8L Y  aK  Y  am  Y  A
3The element  of imperfect  competition  enters  (2)  because  firms  with market
power  do  not  set  the  value  marginal  product  P(8Y/8L)  equal  to  the  factor  price.
If we assume  Cournot  behavior  by firms,  then  we can derive  the first  order
conditions  from  each firm's  profit  maximization  and  write  each  of the  partial
derivatives  8Y18L,  WYUK  and 8Y/8M as follows:
8Yj8H  ijt  p  jt  [  (  e  j  t  Sit  (3a) 8Y18M  -p  ;t  1  +  (Sij/ej)  J  (a
r  1  1r
8Y/8H4  ijt  t  [ . (Sij/e  ) J]  it  P  ij  (3b)
n  1  n
ay/am  ijt  L  I  =  _it  Plj  (3c) dy  =p  jt  1  +  (Sij/ej)  p
Factor  prices  are  given  by  w (the  wage),  r (the  rental  cost  of capital),  and  n
(the  price  of  material  inputs).  If  firm  i  is  not  perfectly  competitive,  then  the
value  of the  marginal  product  exceeds  the  factor  cost  by some  mark-up  p.  Note
that  p is  a function  of  the  industry  demand  elasticity  e (which  is  negative)  and
the firm's  market  share  S.  We assume  that  firms  in  the same  industry  face  the
same ej, and that the demand  elasticity  is constant  over the time period
estimated. Initially,  we also assume  that Sijt  =  Sj for all i  and t.  This
implies  that  firm  shares  (by  industry)  are  relatively  stable  over  the  period  of
estimation  and  of  equal  sizs.  We relax  this  assumption  in Section  IV,  allowing
shares  (and  consequently  mark-ups)  to  vary  over  firms  and  over  time.  The  above
specification  also imposes  the restriction  that the mark-up  must always  be
greater  than  or equal  to  unity.  In  a one-period  oligopoly  model,  firms  are  not
4allowed  to  make short-run  losses  because  such  behavior  would  not  be rational.
This  restriction  is probably  unnecessary  but is not rejected  by the  data (see
Section  III).
Substituting  3a-3c  into  (2)  and  rearranging  terms,  we have
dYijt  #ji  wL dL  +  rK  dK  +  nM dM  +  dAjt  +  fi  (4)
Y  PY  L  PY  K  PY  M  A ~.Xijt  ~  [wLd+  rKdK+  M~  ~  ~  ~i  (4
The  value  of  wL/PY,  rK/PY  and  nM/PY  is  simply  the  share  of each  factor  (labor,
capital,  materials)  in total  output.  We shall  denote  the share  of labor  and
materials  as a, and  am.  Under  constant  returns  to scale,  the  factor  shares
would  sum  to  1/p,  but  we  will retain  a  general  formulation  and  allow  the  sum  of
the  factor  shares  to  equal  B/p,  where  B  may  be less  than  or  greater  than  one.3/
Rewriting  (4),
dy ijt - /j  [  aldl +  lmdm ]ijt  +  (3-l)j  dK/Kijt  +  dA/A jt +fi  (5)
Lower  case  variables  y, 1  and  m are  equal  to  ln(Y/K),  ln(L/K),  and  ln(M/K).  The
mark-up  i  is just the  coefficient  on the  changes  in  L/K and  M/K,  weighted  by
their respective  shares in output.  The specification  in (5) imposes  the
restriction  that the  markup coefficient  is equal across  labor and material
inputs.  We test  this  restriction  in  Section  III.
To see  how  estimates  of  productivity  change  dA/A  could  be  biased  due  to the
presence  of  imperfect  competition,  for  the  moment  we  will  assume  constant  returns
to scale  (B-1),  ignore  the  firm-specific  effect,  and  rewrite  (5)  as
5dy - ldl-  - adm  - (p-l)(a 1d1 +  lmdm)  +  dA/A  (6)
We  will refer to  #  as the "observed'  productivity  measure, and  dA/A as the 'true"
productivity change.  Under perfect competition ,  p=l and *  - dA/A.  The Solow
measure of productivity dA/A is unbiased.
If #  is greater than 1, however, there are two possible sources of bias.
First, we may get bias in estimating the level of productivity change dA/A. If
1 and m  are rising (falling), then dA/A is over  (under) estimated. Second,
changes in the trend rate of growth of productivity  will be mismeasured. Figure
1  outlines the  possible biases  in estimating  changes in  the trend  rate of growth
of productivity.  As an example,  we explore the case  where price-cost  margins
Figure 1
Direction of Bias in Productivity Estimates
dA/A =  true  productivity
=  observed productivity
Case A  Case B
aidl - amdm > O  a1dl - amdm  < 0
Pre-reform
#  >  1  Oi  >  dAj/A 1 1  <  dAj/Al
Post-reform
=  1  02 =  dA2/A 2 =  dA,/A 2
Net change  02 - 01 <  dA2/A2 - dAl/Al  02 - 01 >  dA2/A2 - dAl/A 1
Bias  Productivity  gains  Productivity gains
under-estimated  over-estimated
6exceed  one  and firms  have  market  power  prior  to a trade  reform.  In this  case,
the  level  of  observed  productivity  0 will  be  greater  (1gss)  than  the  true  measure
if 1 and  m are rising  (falling).  If the  trade  reform  is accompanied  by a fall
in market power (possibly  due to increases  in the perceived  elasticity  of
demand),  price-cost  margins  fall  to  unity  and  measured  productivity  will  equal
the  true  productivity  measure  dA/A.  However,  if  we are  interested  in comparing
productivity  before  and after the  changes  in trade  policy,  we are likely  to
incorrectly  assess  the true change  in dA/A.  As illustrated  in Figure  1, the
direction  of the  bias  cannot  be  predicted  on the  basis  of (6)t  we ars equally
likely  to overestimate  or  underestimate  the  increase  in  productivity  following
the  reform.
To see  how  estimates  oi productivity  dA/A  could  be biased  due  to increasing
or decreasing  returns  to scale,  let  us assume  perfect  competition  (it  - 1) and
rewrite  (5)  as (6)'
dy - aldl  - amdm  - 0  - (3-1)j  dK/K + dA/A  (6)'
If 3  exceeds  1, then the technology  is characterized  by increasing  returns.
Observed  productivity  measure  will exceed  the  true  value  dA/A  as long  as dK/K
is positive,  so TFP is over-estimated.  Under  decreasing  returns,  TFP  will be
under-estizrated.  Since  increasing  returns are  consistent with  imperfect
competition,  empirically  we should  observe  b greater  than  1 and  market  power
concurrently.
7II.  Trade  Policy  in  the  Cote  d'Ivoire
The  trade  regime  in  the  Cote  d'Lvoire  becamp  increasingly  restrictive  in  the
1970a.  In  1973.  a  major  restructuring  of  the  tariff  code  increased  nominp1  tariff
rates  and raised  levels  of effective  protection  by implementing  an escalated
tariff  structure.  In the second  half of the 1970s  and in the early 1.980s,
quantitative  restrictions  and arbitrary  reference  prices  were introduced  on a
wide range  of imports  competing  with domestic  manufactures.  Table  ; indicates
the  extent  of trade  protection  across  industrial  sectors  before  the  reform,  as
measured  by  effective  protection  coefficicnts  and  the  number  of  import  licences
(quotas)  issued  across  sectors.  Textiles  and  food-related  manufacturing  received
the  highest  effective  protection,  followed  by  chemicals.  Quotas  were  also  high
in  food  processing  and  beverages,  followed  by textiles  and  chemicals.
During  the  boom years  in the  second  half of the  1970s,  the  Cote  d'Ivoire
benefitted  from the surge  in  world  coffee  and  cocoa  prices.  The increases  in
revenue,  most of which  were captured  by the government,  were used to promote
investment and  expand  public  spending and  infrastructure.  The  severe
macroecononic  imbalances  that followed  the  fall in coffee  prices  forced  the
government  to adopt  an austerity  program  in 1982.  The adjustment  program  was
followed  by a  major  trade  reform  introduced  in  mid-1984.
The  trade  reform  was  implemented  in  1985  ar  4xtended  in  1986  and  early  1987.
The  reform  removed  quantitative  restrictions  and  reference  prices,  rationalized
the  tariff  structure,  and introduced  temporary  tariff  surcharges.  The  goal  of
the  tariff  reform  was  to  equalize  effective  protection  across  different  sectors
by  lowering  tariffs  on  final  goods  and  raising  tariffs  on  inputs  and  intermediate
goods. The  surcharges  declined  over  a  five-year  period  to  allow  firms  previously
protected  by  non-tariff  measures  to  adjust. Tariff  changes  and  the  removal  of
8quotas  was implemented  in two  phases.  In the first  phase (1985),  reforms  were
imposed  on key sectors  including  textiles  and food  processing,  In the second
phase (late  1986,  early 1987),  the reform  was extended  to the rest of the
manufacturing  sector  (fertilizers,  machinery).
Cote d'Ivoire's  nominal  exchange  rate  is fixed  in relation  to the  French
franc  at a rate  which  ic  the  same  for  a  number  of franc  zone  African  countries.
When the  french  franc  appreciated  against  the  US dollar  between  1985  and  1988,
the Ivorian  franc  became  considerably  overvalued  in real  terms.  Consequently,
the reform  was conducted  in  conjut.ction  with  an envircnment  which lowered  the
competitiveness  of exports  on  world  markets.  lthough  the  government  simulated
a  partial  devaluation  through  an  export  subsidy  scheme  for  manufactured  exports,
the first subsidy  payments  were delayed  until mid-1986  and payments  were
concentrated  in several  large  firms.  The  government's  inability  to compensate
exporting  firms for the real appreciation  meant th&t the export  sector  was
adversely  affected.  Consequently,  we should  see  a  fall  in  price-cost  margins  for
exporting  sectors  in  the  post  trade  reform  period.
To account for changes  in behavior  and productivity  during  the trade
reforms  in  Cote d'Ivoire,  we will  want to  modify  (5)  to allow  for  a change  in
mark-ups  by firms  during  the post-1985  period.  Changes  in behavior  would be
captured  by adding  an interactive  slope  dummy  to dx in (5).  If trade  reform
induced  a  shift  in  the  overall  level  of  productivity,  then  we should  also  include
an intercept  dummy.  We then  have  the  estimating  equation:
dy ijt  =  Bljdxijt +  B2;  (D  dx ]ijt  +  B3j D +  B4j dkijt  +  dA/A jt +  fi  (7)
where  Blj
B4j  w(-)
dx  *  alldl  +  amdm
dk  - dK/K
9D  is 1 for  1985-87  and  0 otherwise.  If  trade  policy  changes  did  in  fact  lead  to
more  competitive  firm  Lehavior,  the  coefficient  B2 on (D  dx]  should  be  negative,
reflecting  the fall in mark-ups when firms are exposed to international
competition.  The  coefficient  B4 is  equal  to the  scale  parameter  3  minus  one.  If
the coefficient  is greater than zero, the technology  is characterized  by
increasing  returns;  if  it  is  equal  to  zero,  constant  returns;  if  less  than  zero,
decreasing  returns.  The  productivity  term  dA/A  can  be thought  of as the  sum
of  a  constant  industry  level  rate  Boj  plus  a  residual  uit.  This  yields  our  final
estimating  equation:
dy ijt - Bljdxijt +  B2j [D  dx )ijt  +  B3j D +  B4j dkijt  +  Boj +  fi +  uit  (7)
If  the  individual  effect  fi  is  fixed,  we can  estimate  (7)  using  a standard  fixed
effect  approach.  Tf,  however,  fi  is  random,  then  estimating  (7)  as  a  fixed  effect
model  will yield  consistent but inefficient  estimates.  Under  a random  effect
model,  the  most efficient  estimate  of (7)  requires  generalized  least  squares
(GLS). 4/  Since  the  individual  effect  in (1)  is  modelled  as a difference  in
production  technology  which  is  not likely  to  vary  randomly  across  individuals,
the  fixed  effect  model  is  probably  the  more appropriate  specification.
Data
The firm data is taken from information  sent to the Banque  de Donnees
Financieres  (BdDF),  which is instructed  to gather  annual  information  on all
industrial  firms. The  number  of firms  in individual  years  ranges  from  around
250  in the  mid-1970s  to  nearly  500  in  the  mid-1980s.  Although  the  coverage  of
10the industrial  sector is  incomplete (informal  enterprises  are excluded  and small
formal  firms  are  under-represented),  the  BdDF  covers  almost  all large  and  medium-
size formal manufacturing enterprises. We chose our sample of 287  firms by
selecting  out  those  enterprises  with a complete  time  series.  Although  we include
firms  which were only present during part of the 1975-1987 period, we exclude
firms  which had missing  values between their  entry  and exit dates.  Table 2 shows
that  our  sample  includes  the  major firms  in  each of  the  manufacturing subsectors.
The sample firms accounted for over half of all sales in 1987 for all sectors
covered. For 10 of the 13 sectors, these  firms accounted for over 70 percent  of
all output in 1987.
We estimate (7)  using our panel of 287 Ivorian  firms during the period 1975
to 1987.  Since firms in different sectors are likely to exhibit different
degrees of  competition and  face different sets of  demand  elasticities, we
estimate the equation separately  across 9 sectors (see  Table 2).  The approach
requires  data on real  output, capital stock, labor  and  material inputs,  and the
shares of labor and materials in total output. Total sales  and material inputs
were deflated by 2 digit sectoral level  price deflators to obtain a real output
and materials series. We also calculated a material input price deflator based
on input-output  tables for each of the sectors,  but the estimation results  were
unaffected and are not reported  here. Real capital stock  was constructed in two
steps.  First, for those firms  that reported  across the entire sample  period,  we
used the perpetual inventory  method. Real capital stock in period t is defined
as:
Kit =  (l-d)Ki,t_l  +  It  (8)
11As a benchmark,  we used  1976 capital  stock  for  each firm  and then  added  real
investment  while  accounting  for  depreciation.  Real investment  was computed  by
deflating  nominal  investment  by sector-specific  investment  price  deflators.  To
construct  a  base  year  real  capital  stock  for  the  remaining  sample  of  firms  which
entered  after  1976,  we first  constructed  a capital  stock  price  deflator  (KPD)
using  data  on firms  that  were  present  in  all  years:
n
1  Kijt




KPDjt  is  the  capital  stock  deflator  for  sector  j in  year  t. It  was constructed
using  the  ratio  of the  real  capital  stock  computed  in  (8)  to  the  nominal  capital
stock  (NK)  reported  firms  that  were present  in all  years.  The real  base year
capital  stock  for  a firm  entering  in  yeer  t is then  given  by the  product
Kijt  - (KPDjt)  (NKit)  (10)
where  t is  the  base  year  capital  stock  for  firm  i. For  subsequent  years,  real
capital  stock  is then  computed  using  equation  (8).
The total  number  of employees  for  each  firm  was used  as a  measure  of labor
input.  The  dataset  does  not  include  hours  worked,  which  is  the  variable  used  by
Hall (1988)  and  Domowitz,  Hubbard  and  Petersen  (1988)  to  measure  labor  input.
However,  using  numbers  of  employees  rather  than  hours  should  be  accurate  as long
as there  has not  been  a trend  in  economy-wide  hours  per  employee.  The  results
of  household  surveys  for  the  Cote  d'Ivoire  (the  LSMS  World  Bank  project)  for  1985
and 1986 indicate  that average  hours worked per employee  did not change
12significantly  over  this  two  year  period.  5/  Since  these  two  years  include  both
a year  of unusual  growth  (1985)  as well as a recession  (1986),  the  fact that
hours  worked  per  employee  was  relatively  stable  suggests  that  the  biases  in  using
numbers  of  employees  should  not  be  too  important.  However,  we cannot  dismiss  the
possibility  that  there  may  have  been  a  trend-line  change  in  hours  over  the  longer
1976-87  period.
Since  there  are  only several  firms  in some  of the industries  listed  in
Table  2,  we aggregated  our  firm  sample  into  nine  sectors:  grain  processing,  food
processing,  other  food,  textiles,  chemicals,  transport,  machinery,  wood, and
paper products.  Sample  means  by sector  for the pre- and post-  trade reform
periods  are  given  in  Table  3. Growth  rates  dropped  in 6 of the 9 sectors,  but
the  average  annual  growth  rate  stayed  constant,  averaging  4.8  percent.  Over  the
1976-1984  period,  the  average  growth  rate  is  high  due  to the  boom  in  the  economy
in  the  1970s.  When  trade  reforms  were  introduced  in  1985,  the  economy  experienced
a period of growth, but 1986 and particularly 1987 was a recessionary period.
The burden of the adjustment appears to have fallen disproportionately on the
labor  force,  with the annual  average  growth  of employees  falling  from  2.0
percent  to 1.4  percent.  One  shortcoming  of the  labor  input  variable  is that  it
measures  the  number  of permanent  employees  hired by the firm,  but does not
include  information  on temporary  workers.  One possibility,  which we do not
investigate,  is  that  the  fall  in  number  of permanent  employees  was accompanied
by  an increase  in  the  temporary  labor  force.  However,  the  fall  in  employment  by
the  formal  sector,  documented  in  Table  2,  has  been  confirmed  by other
studies.  6/
In Table  3,  we also  report  total  factor  productivity,  unadjusted  for  market
power  effects.  The  productivity  measure  was calculated  using  a Tornquist  index
13number  formula  (see  definition  in  Table  3).  Under  trade  reform,  the  unadjusted
measure  shows  productivity  increases  in  most  sectors  (food  processing,  chemicals,
transport,  machinery,  and  paper  products)  but  declines  in others  (textiles  and
wood products).  On average  productivity  growth  accelerated  under the trade
reform,  rising  from 0.7  percent  to 1.5  percent.
III.  Estimation
We first  estimate  (7)  using  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  and adopting  the
assumption  of  constant returns to scale. We  also estimate (7) assuming
alternately  a fixed  effect  and  a  random  effect  specification.  Since  inputs  and
output are  jointly determined,  however, we  then estimate (7) using an
instrumental  variables  technique.  In  Section  IV  we  will  explore  the  consequences
of relaxing  the  assumptions  of  constant  returns  and  equal  mark-ups  across  firms.
The  OLS  results,  without  accounting  for  fixed  effects,  are  presented  in  Table
4.  The  coefficient  B1 should  measure  the  extent  of  market  power  across  sectors,
while  B2 indicates  the  change  in  price-cost  margins  under  trade  reform.  The  mark-
up of price  over  marginal  cost is highest  in the food and textiles  sectors,
ranging  from  28  percent  for  the  "other  food"  category  to  13  percent  for  textiles.
We note that  these  are  the  sectors  with  the  highest  levels  of protection  prior
to  trade  reform  (refer  to  Table  1).  At the  same  time,  these  are  also  the  sectors
with  the  greatest  degree  of  outward  orientation  (See  Table  A.1).  Since  we  cannot
separate  production  for  export  and the  domestic  market  due to the fact that
inputs  are  not  recorded  separately,  it  is  impossible  to  test  the  hypothesis  that
exporters  charge  high  prices  in  the  domestic  market  but  price  more  competitively
abroad.
14The  coefficient  on  B2 is  negative  in  six  out  of  nine  sectors,  which  would
support  the  hypothesis  that  price-cost  margins  fell  during  the  trade  reforms.
However,  B2 is only statistically  significant  (and  negative)  for the textile
sector,  which  suggests  that  the  changes  in  trade  policy  generally  did  not  affect
price-cost  margins  except  in the  textile  sector,  where  the  coefficient  has the
expected  negative  sign.  Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  the  conversion  of  quotas
to tariffs  led  to large  scale  underinvoicing,  which  was particularly  severe  in
the  textile  3ector.  For  the  other  sectors,  it is  possible  that  changes  made  in
1987  in  the  structure  of  protection  for  chemicals  and  transport  were too  recent
to show up  in our data. The coefficient  on B3 indicates  the change in
productivity  growth  during  the  trade  policy  reforms.  The  coefficient  is  positive
for  6  of  the  9 sectors,  but  only  statistically  significant  and  positive  for  the
paper  sector.  Paper  products  experienced  an unusual  increase  in growth  during
the  trade reform period (see Table 3). Since productivity  is typically
procyclical,  the  statistically  sig-Lificant  increase  in  productivity  growth  during
the  reform  period  may  only  partly  be  attributed  to  changes  in  the  trade  regime.
We  noted  earlier  that  our  specification  imposes  the  restriction  that mark-
ups are equal  across  labor  and  material  inputs.  We test this restriction  by
allowing  separate  coefficients  on  labor  and  material  inputs  in  (5).  The  F-value
for  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  coefficients  are  equal  is  also  included  in  Table
4.  Equality  of input  coefficients  is  accepted  for  six  out  of  nine  sectors  in  our
sample.  Abbott,  Griliches,  and  Hausman  (1989)  estimated  a  similar  equation  using
US data for the cement industry  and found that the restriction  of equal
coefficients  was  not  accepted.  Rotemberg  and  Summers  (1988)  suggest  that  failure
of the  model specification  may reflect  labor  hoarding.  We noted  earlier  that
movements  in  labor  inputs  may  not  be fully  reflected  due  to the  possibility  of
15hiring  temporary  workers.  In our data, rejection  of the specification  test
occurred  when the  coefficient  on the  labor  input  was close  to zero,  indicating
no correlation  between  output  and  labo-  inputs.  However,  the  coefficient  should
still  capture  price-cost  margins  because  of movements  in  material  inputs.
The  specification  above  ignores  any  fixed  effects  which  may  be specific  to
the  individual  firms.  If  fixed  effects  are  present,  then  our  estimating  equation
is  mis-specified  and  the  coefficients  may  be biased. One  way to test  for  this
possibility  is  to  compare  the  OLS  results  with  estimates  which  allow  for  a firm-
specific  effect  which is constant  over time.  We test for this alternative
specification  using  a  standard  fixed-effect,  within-group  estimator.  The  within
estimates  are reported  in Table 5. There is virtually  no movement in the
parameters.  An F-test of the  restriction  that the OLS and  fixed effect
coefficients  are  equal  is  accepted  for  all  sectors.  Either  a fixed  effect  is  not
present,  or is  removed  by estimating  the  equation  in  growth  rates  instead  of in
levels.  We also explore  the  possibility  that the firm-specific  effect  fi is
random.  If  fi  is  random  and  not  fixed,  then  estimating  a fixed  effect  model  using
OLS  will  be  unbiased  but  not  as  efficient  as  generalized  least  squares  estimation
(GLS).  The  GLS  estimates  are  presented  in  Appendix  Table  A.2.  The  random  effects
specification  does  not  yield  statistically  differEnt  estimates  from  OLS.
The OLS estimates  are likely  to be biased  since inputs  and output  are
simultaneously  determined  by the  firm.  Table  6  presents  instrumental  variables
(IV)  estimates  under  the  maintained  assumption  of  constant  returns  to  scale.  The
instruments  should  be  correlated  with  the  endogenous  right-hand  side  variables
dX  and  D  dX  but  independent  of  any  demand  or  productivity  shocks.  As instruments
we use  the  second  lag  of the  nominal  exchange  rate,  a price  index  for  energy,
the  second  lags  of employment  and  materials,  and  the  second  lag  of the  firm's
16debt to sales ratio.  The price of energy  should be correlated  with input
decisions  but  independent  of any  demand  shocks  or productivity  shocks  affecting
the  firm.  We use  the  second  lag  (in  levels)  for  inputs  instead  of  the  first  lag
since  the  right-hand  side  variables  already  include  current  and  lagged  values.
We also include  the second  lag  of the firm's  debt to sales  ratio,  under the
assumption  that  the  firm's  borrowings  should  be  correlated  with  ability  to  expand
inputs  but  are  predetermined.
Following  Bowden  and  Turkington  (1984),  we  instrument  the  product  D  dX  using
a  nonlinear  combination  of  the  dummy  D  and  dX.  In  our  case,  this  is  just  the  set
of  variables  D, instruments  for  dX,  and  the  product  of  D and  the  instruments.7/
The  instrumental  variable  estimates  in  Table  6  were  tested  for  stability  using
various  alternative  sets  of instruments,  including  a composite  wage index.  Our
experience  (which  is  confirmed  by  Abbot  et  al (1989))  suggests  that  the  standard
instruments  which  are  used  in  these  types  of  regressions,  such  as  GNP,  are  likely
to  be correlated  with  the  error  term  and  may lead  to  biased  estimates  of  price-
cost  margins. Alternative  specifications  which  employed  GNP  as an instrument
in  the  first  stage  of  the  regression  led  to  rejection  of  the  over-identification
tests  for  the  exogeneity  of our  instruments.  8/
The  estimated  coefficients  in Table  6 show  a similar  pattern  to the  OLS
estimates.  Mark-ups  are highest  for food-related  and textile  firms.  However,
due to the  larger  standard  errors,  we can  only reject  the  null hypothesis  of
perfect  competition  for  one  of the  food  sectors,  machinery,  and  wood  products.
Mark-ups  generally  fall during  the trade  reform  period,  ds  indicated  by the
negative  coefficient  on B2. The fall  in  mark-ups  is statistically  significant
(and  negative)  for  three  sectors:  food  processing,  textiles,  and  wood  products.
Since  the  level  of  protection  in  textiles  was  quite  high  before  the  trade  reform,
i7it  is likely  that  the  fall  in  quotas  contributed  to lower  mark-ups.  The  fall  in
margins  for  food  processing  and  wood  products,  however,  seems  to be linked  to
the  adverse  impact  of the franc's  appreciation.  Table  A.1  shows  the share  of
exports  in  total  sales  for  the  firms  in  our  sample.  The  food  processing  (cocoa,
coffee)  and wood sectors  are the most export  oriented  of all nine sectors.
Despite  the  subsidies  to  offset  the  negative  impact  of  appreciation  on  exporters,
it  appears  that  the  outward  oriented  sectors  were  most  negatively  affected  during
the  trade  reform.
Table  6 reports  the  F-value  when  we test  the  restriction  that  the  price-
cost  margin  cannot  fall  below  one,  which  is  an implication  of  our  model.  For  all
sectors,  margins  were either  positive  or not statitistically  different  from
unity.  We also test  the  validity  of our instruments  in Table  6. Newey (1985)
suggests  a chi-square  test  which  may  be applied  if the  estimating  equation  is
overidentified  and a subset  of the instruments  is assumed  to be valid.  A
regression  of the  residuals  from  the  first  stage  regression  on the  instruments
yields  a  chi-square  test  of  the  validity  of  our  instruments.  The  results  of  this
test,  shown  in  Table  6. suggest  that  in  all  cases  our  instruments  are  valid.
IV.  Alternative  Specifications
Increasing  or Decreasing  Returns  to Scale
One important  source  of mis-specification  arises  from  assuming  that the
technology  is  characterized  by  constant  returns,  which  permits  us  to  omit  dk  from
equation  (7).  Recall  from  (7)  that  the  coefficient  on  dk is  given  by  B-1,  where
13  is  the  returns  to  scale  parameter.  Under  constant  returns,  B equals  1  and  the
18coefficient  on  dk is  zero.  Under  increasing  returns,  however,  B exceeds  one  and
the  coefficient  on dk is  positive. If the  technology  is  not characterized  by
constant  returns,  then  omitting  dk induces  a  classic  omitted  variable  bias.  The
extent  of  the  bias  is  given  by  the  product  R (B-1),  where  13-1  is  the  coefficient
on dk and  R is the coefficient  of dk regressed  on dx (see  Schmidt (1976)).
Assuming  that R is negative,  price-cost  margins  will be under-estimated  with
increasing  returns  to scale.  If, on the other  hand,  the technology  exhibits
decreasing  returns,  the  margins  are  over-estimated.
We investigate  the  possibility  of bias  due to the  technology  assumptions
in Table  7. Table  7 shows  the same  pattern  of price-cost  margins  as earlier
estimates.  Margins  are  highest  in  textiles,  export-related  products  (wood,  food
processing),  and  chemicals.  The  coefficient  on  dk  is  statistically  significant
for  one  product  group,  "other  food". For  this  product,  the  mark-up  falls  when
the capital stock is included  in  the regression  equation. The negative
coefficient  on the  capital  stock  variable,  whict'  indicates  decreasing  returns,
means  that  price-cost  margin are  over-estimated  for  that  sector.  For  all  other
sectors,  however, the coer.icient  on the capital stock variable is not
significant.  For most of our sample, specification  of  the technology  as
characterized  by constant  returns  is  not inappropriate.
Another potential shortcoming  of  the  original specification  is  the
assumption,  implicit  in  the  first  order  conditions  3a-3c,  that  the  value  of the
marginal  prod_.ct  of  capital  is  set  equal  to  a mark  up  #  multiplied  by the  cost
of  capital  (r)  in  every  period. A  profit-maximizing  firm  might  choose  labor  (L)
and  materials  (M)  in the  short  run,  and  take  capital  (K)  to  be predetermined.
It  can  be shown  that  if  we alter  the  original  maximization  problem  of the  firm
so  that  the  production  technology  is  given  by
19Y - A  G( L ,  M ;  K)  (1)'
then  equation  (5)  becomes
dy '  [aldl +  amdm I  +  (aidl  +  amdm)  - 1+5  ] dK/K  +  dA/A
(5)'
where  6  =  OG/8K  (K/Y)
Empirically,  we cannot  distinguish  between  equation  (5)' above  and the
specification  which  allows  for  increasing  (or  decreasing)  returns  to  scale.  Both
theoretical  models  suggest  that  dK/K  should  be included  on the  right  hand  side
of  the  estimating  equation.  However,  since  our  results  indicate  that  in  general
dK/K  is  insignificant,  the  fact  that  we cannot  assign  a  specific  interpretation
to  the  coefficient  on  dK/K  is  not  particularly  important  in  this  paper.  However,
any  approach  which  seeks  to interpret  the  coefficient  on dK/K  as an indication
of scale economies should take into consideration the dual interpretations  of
the  parameter.  A  significant  coefficient  on  dK/K  may  indicate  either  non-contant
returns to scale  or short-run  profit maximization  which takes capital stock as
given.
Varying Price-cost margins across firms and over time
Another possible source of mis-specification arises from the possibility
that  the  price-cost  margin  should  vary  across  firms  and  over  time.  The
justification for firm-specific and time varying shares comes from equations
3(a)-3(c), which show that the mark-up is related to firm shares through the
equation:
201  e
p(S)ijt  =  (11)
1 +  (Si  jt/ej]  e  +  Sijt
Recall that the elasticity  e is  negative. Mark-ups in the simple  Cournot
framework should be  positively related to  firm shares. To  account for  the
dependence of p on S, we take a first  order Taylor approximation  of (11)  around
an initial point a:
e  -e (S - a)
/A(S)  - +
e + a  (e  +  a)2
Rearranging terms,  we have
/5(S)  - B1 +  B4 S  (12)
e  ea
where  B1 =  +2
(e  + a)  (e  + a)2
- e
B5 =  (e  +  a)2
Combining (7)  and (12),
dyijt  BOj +  Blidxijt +  B2j (D  dx)ijt +  B3j D +
+  B4; (S  dx]ijt  +  B5j  (S  D  dx]ijt  +  uit  (13)
If  the  price-cost  margin  does  not  vary  across  firms,  then  the  coefficients  B4
and  B5 should  be statistically  insignificant  and the  coefficient  on dx collapses
to the  mark-up parameter u. We calculate firm shares  by using as a denominator
total  output  by sector less  export  sales,  available  from the  BdDF database.  The
firm's share of domestic output is the ratio of the firm's  domestic sales less
21export  sales  to total  sector  (domestic)  output.  One  of  the  shortcomings  of  this
approach  is the lack of import  data.  Consequently,  the variable  S does not
represent  the  firm's  share  of total  domestic  consumption,  but it  does  indicate
the  firm's  share  of  domestically  produced  output.
In Table  8, our es imates  for (13) show that the coefficient  on S is
statistically  insignificant  across  all  sectors.  The  statistical  insignificance
of  S  seems  to indicate  that  differences  in  shares,  either  across  firms  and  over
time,  are  not a source  of  varying  mark-ups.  The  patterns  observed  earlier  are
also  exhibited  in  Table  8.  Price-cost  margins  are  highest  for  textiles  and  export
oriented  sectors.  Nevertheless,  there are a number of problems  with this
approach. The  coefficient  on S should  be positive  (see  equation  12),  yet for
half  the  sectors  it  is  in  fact  negative.  One  possibility  is  that  a  simple  Cournot
model  may  not  be  appropriate  as  an  explanation  for  the  observed  mark-ups.  Another
problem  is that firm shares  are calculated  as a fraction  of total domestic
output.  Finally,  the estimates  may be highly  imprecise  since  nearly  all the
right-hand  side variables are  endogenous.  Nevertheless,  our  instrumental
variables  estimates  in Table  8 do give  statistically  significant  coefficients
for  the  price-cost  mark-up,  in  contrast  to  the  insignificant  estimates  on  S. In
future  work, it may be desirable  to explore  the dependence  of the  price-cost
margin  on other  (possibly  firm-specific'  factors.
Changes  in  Capacity  Utilizaticn
Another possible  source  of misspecification  arises from the fact that
observed  price-cost  margins  may  fluctuate  as  capacity  utilization  changes  over
the  business  cycle.  If,  for  example,  trade  reform  was  accompanied  by  contractions
22in  output  of  the  tradeable  sectors,  then  changes  in  mark-ups  may  reflect  capacity
changes  rather  than  shifts  in  competitive  behavior.  In  this  case,  we  only  observe
measured  capital  stock  K . The  true  K is  equal  to  K  E,  where  E reflects  changes
in  utilization  of  capacity.
If the  production  function  is  given  by Y  - A g(L,K*E,M)  then  the  resulting
estimating  equation  becomes
dy - de - Bo  +  Bl {  aldl +  amdm  - (a,  + am)  de}
+  B2 CD  {  aldl  + amdm  - (a,  + am)  de } ]  + B3 D  (14)
Since  we do not have estimates  of capacity  utilization  at the firm  level,  we
employ  a measure  of total  energy  use  as a proxy.  A plant's  energy  use is the
input  component  most  likely  to  vary  as  capacity  utilization  fluctuates.  The  OLS
and  instrumental  variable  estimates  for  equation  (14)  are  shown  on  Table  9. The
general  patterns  observed  earlier  are  reproduced  again  in  Table  9. In  addition,
the fall  in  margins  becomes  even  more significant  following  the trade  reform,
for  both the  OLS  and  the  instrumental  variable  estimates.
V.  Modified  TFP Estimates
In  Section  I  we showed  that  TFP  can  be  mismeasured  in  the  presence  of  either
imperfect  competition  or  non-constant  returns  to  scale.  The  results  from  Section
III  indicate  that  market  power  cannot  be rejected  for  a  number  of  manufacturing
sectors  in the  Cote d'Ivoire.  Here we incorporate  those findings  to analyze
productivity  before  and  after  the  trade  reforms.
Although  productivity  may be estimated  in a number  of different  ways,  one
23standard  approach  is to use the Tornquist  index  number  formula,  which is a
discrete  approximation  to  the  formula  derived  in  equation  (6):
TFP - (In  Yt - In  Yt.1-  Cal (ln  Lt - ln Lt-i )  +  am (ln  Mt - ln Mt-,)
+  (1 - al - am )(In  Kt - ln Kt-. )]  (15)
where  al  1/2 (alt  + alt_l)
am  5  1/2 (amt  +  amt-l)
If  we incorporate  the  mark-up  factor  p,  equation  (15)  can  be  written  as:
TFP  - (in  Yt  ln Yt-_] - #  (a,  (ln  Lt - ln Lt_1 ) +  am (ln  Mt - ln  Mt_,)
+  (1/p - a, - am )(ln Kt - ln Kt_l )]  (16)
Estimates  of  #  were taken  from  Table  9 to calculate  revised  TFP  estimates
before  and  under  the trade  reforms.  Estimates  of productivity  using  both the
original  and revised  definitions  (equations  (15)  and (16) respectively)  are
presented  in  Table  10.  Since  the  model  imposes  the  restriction  that  the  price-
cost  margin  must be greater  than  or equal  to unity,  we impose  the  restriction
that  margins  cannot  fall  below  unity.  The  original  estimates  are  reproduced  from
Table  3.  Under  the  assumption  of  perfect  competition,  we find  that  productivity
increased  under trade  reform  for six of the  nine sectors.  Over all sectors,
productivity  rose  from  an average  of .7  to 1.5  percent  annually. If  we relax
the  assumption  of  perfect  competition,  the  gain  in  productivity  is  much  smaller.
Productivity  only  rises  in 5 sectors,  with smaller  increases  overall.  Since
labor  and  material  inputs  per  unit  of  capital  experienced  negative  growth  prior
to  1985,  TFP  is  underestimated  in  equation  (15),  and  the  change  in  productivity
after  1985 is overstated.  On average,  the  adjusted  productivity  measure  only
rises  slightly,  from  .7  to .9  percent  growth  annually.  The results  in  Table  10
24suggest  that  productivity  estimates  are  highly  sensitive  to the  assumption  of
perfect  competition.  For  example,  in  the  food  sector  when  we introduce  imperfect
competition,  the  gain in  productivity  post-reform  rises  from .8  percent  to 2-
percent  annually.  On average,  our data suggests  that when we  incorporate
imperfect  competition  into the productivity  estimates,  there  is no apparent
relationship  between  productivity  and  trade  reform.  However,  two  aspects  of  the
reform  must  be  acknowledged.  First,  the  estimated  time  period  for  the  sample  post
reform  is  only  three  years.  If there  are  any  productivity  gains  associated  with
trade  reform,  such  gains  may  only  appear  over  a longer  time  period.  Second,  the
reform  was  accompanied  by a real  appreciation  of the  currency,  which  adversely
affected  exporting  sectors.  Table  10 shows  that  productivity  fell  primarily  in
exporting  sectors,  but  generally  increased  in  other  sectors.
Conclusion
Research  on pruductivity  has often focused  on the relationship  between
productivity  increases  and  structural  changes  in  an  economy,  such  as  trade  policy
reform.  If,  however,  those  structural  changes  affect  the  nature  of  competition
or  have  scale  effects,  then  both  the  levels  and  the  changes  in  productivity  may
be mismeasured.  In this paper,  we extend  previous  studies to measure the
relationship  between  productivity,  market  power,  and  trade  reform.
Using  a panel  of 287 firms  in the Cote d'Ivoire,  we test for imperfect
competition  before  and after  the 1985 trade reform.  We find that protected
sectors  such  as textiles  have  significant  mark-ups  of  price  over  marginal  cost.
We also find evidence  that price-cost  margins fell between 1985 and 1987.
However,  the  fall  in  mark-ups  for  exporting  sectors  is  likely  to  be linked  more
25to the real appreciation  of  the currency than to  increases in domestic
competition.
If we  incorporate  measures of price-cost  margins into estimates  of
productivity,  we find  that  these  estimates  are  extremely  sensitive  to  the  usual
assumptions  made  about competition.  Whereas there seems to be  a  strong
relationship  between trade reform  and productivity  when we assume  perfect
competition  in  the  product  markets,  this  relationship  almost  disappears  when  we
allow  for  varying  mark-ups.  These  results  may  be qualified,  however,  by noting
that when the exporting  sectors  are excluded  from the analysis,  there are
productivity  gains  associated  with trade  reform.  The results  support  recent
arguments  (see  Rodrik  (1988))  that  the theoretical  basis for  a positive  link
between trade reform  and productivity  growth should  be explored  in future
research.  More  analytical  efforts  are  needed  which  explicitly  model  the  possible
links  between  trade  policy  and  productivity  growth.
26Notes
1/ For an overview of this literature,  see Helpman and Krugman (1989).
2/  An exception is  de Melo and  Urata (1986),  which compares reported price-cost
margins for two census years before and after reforms in Chile. Research on
developed  country data includes  Domowitz,  Hubbard, and Petersen (1986),  who use
aggregate data to find a negative relationship between import penetration and
reported price-cost  margins.
3/ To see  why this holds, say  we have a production function given by
Y = ALaMbKc, where a +  b +  c sum to 3, the scale parameter. If  we
take logs and differentiate,  we see that
dY L  dY  M  dY K
- = a + b + c - B
dL Y  dM  Y  dK Y
dY L
But from our first order conditions,  --  - =  Y  a 1 ,  etc. so
dL Y
we have  j al +  p am +  I  ak =  '-
4/ For a description of GLS for  panel data, see  Hsiao (1986).
5/  A regression  of  hours  worked on  several  control  variables (sex,  age,  location,
education) and a year dummy yielded an insignificant coefficient on the year
dummy with a t-statistic  of 1.54.
6/ See 'Cote d'Ivoire: Industrial Competitiveness During Economic Crisis ard
Adjustment", Klaus Lorch, 1989.
7/ If instead  we had regressed  dx on a set  of instruments to obtain a predicted
value for dx, and then  calculated the  predicted dx multiplied by Dl, this  would
have yielded a biased coefficient  on the product dx Dl.
8/ Estimates of the alternative specifications available from the author on
re.huest.
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29TABLE 1
Estimates of Protection  Across Sectors,
1980 and 1982
Nominal Tariff  Effective Tariff  Occurences of
Protection  Protection  Import Licenses
Sector  Coefficient 1980  C  fficient 1980  1982
I  Food Processing
and Beverages
Grain processing  - - 6
Food processing  1.359  3.340  34
Beverages  - - 17
Oils  1.405  1.829  2
Other  1.493  1.829  0
II  Textiles
Clothing  1.422  2.455  182
Leather, footwear  1.303  1.307  39
III  Chemicals
Chemicals  1.309  1.337  52
Rubber  1.387  1.489  10
IV  Transport,  Machinery
Transport  1.245  1.245  17
Machinery  1.230  1.230  9
V  Wood, paper products
Wood  1.258  1.276  4
Paper
Source:  'The  C6te d'Ivoire in Transition:  From Structural  Adjustment to Self-
sustained  Growth," World Bank, 1987
30TABLE 2
Sample  Coverage
Sector  Number of Firms  Percentage of Formal
Manufacturing Sector
1987
I  Food Processing  50
and Beverages
Grain processing  17  72Z
Food processing  15  91
Beverages  5  98
Oils  5  98
Other  8  50
II  Textiles  39
Clothing  23  86
Leather, footwear  16  53
III  Chemicals  48
Chemicals  43  76
Rubber  5  98
IV  Transport,  Machinery  81
Transport  28  68
Machinery  53  74
V  Wood, paper products  69
Wood  45  76
Paper  24  75
Total firms  287
31TABLE 3
Sample Heans of Growth Rates for Selected Variables
1976-  1984  1985-  1987
Real  Real
Sector  Output  Employment  Materials  Capital  TFP 1/  Output  Employment  Materials  Capital  tFP
Grain processing  3.3  3.0  3.0  2.7  0.1  3.2  -9.9  5.5  0.2  1.4
Foed processing  5.1  6.5  2.9  3.0  1.4  -2.7  -0.2  -3.7  5.4  0.9
Other food  10.9  7.7  10.2  8.7  0.5  4.0  4.3  2.9  2.7  1.3
Textiles  2.7  1.5  1.7  3.2  0.4  -0.5  1.1  -0.5  7.7  -1.5
Chemicals
2 '  7.4  2.7  6.6  9.3  1.3  12.7  6.3  12.6  3.1  3.6
Transport  -2.3  -1.4  -2.2  4.8  -1.3  11.4  2.4  11.8  6.9  1.7
Machinery
2/  6.8  -0.7  6.9  7.9  1.6  -2.8  -4.6  -10.1  -2.8  5.3
Wood  products  1.5  1.5  1.1  1.3  0.6  -0.4  2.3  3.3  2.1  -3.4
Paper  products  4.3  2.9  4.8  4.4  -0.3  9.6  -0.1  4.4  4.5  6.2
All  Sectors  4.8  2.0  4.3  5.6  0.7  4.9  1.4  4.5  3.7  1.5
I/  TFP is defined using the Tornquist index number formula, with
TFP =  [ln Yt - ln Yt-1]  [al (ln Lt - ln Lt-1)  +  im  (ln Mt  - ln  Mt-1)  +  (1 - 1 - am)  (ln  Kt  - ln  Kt-l)J.
Labor and material  shares are defined as follows: Ml =  1/2 (alt +  CIt_I),  am - 1/2 (amt +  amt_l).
2/  The  two  periods  for  parts  of  this  sector  are  divided  into  1976-86  and  1987.TABLE 4
OLS Results
Estimating




Sector  Bl  B2 B3  for Bl-1  Equal 1/  N  R2
Grain  1.206  -.042  .004  15.7  1.4  117  .88
processing  (.052)  (.082)  (.023)
Food  .911  -.114  -.015  2.1  20.3  110  .73
processing  (.061)  (.123)  (.037)
Other food  1.281  .065  .013  30.1  0.1  162  .82
(.051)  (.142)  (.027)
Textiles  1.136  -.125  -.035  6.1  0.0  260  .72
(.055)  (.086)  (.028)
Chemicals  1.068  -.029  .022  3.5  2.3  361  .77
(.036)  (.070)  (.019)
Transport  1.027  .013  .021  0.5  4.2  160  .86
(.038)  (.079)  (.023)
Machinery  1.078  -.001  .040  8.2  0.3  333  .83
(.027)  (.202)  (.035)
Wood products  1.055  -.051  -.033  3.6  44.1  284  .85
(.029)  (.070)  (.025)
Paper products  1.055  .179  .077  1.0  2.2  157  .82
(.056)  (.087)  (.026)
All Sectors  1.078  -.019  .008  33.0  32.3  1944  .80
(.014)  (.030)  (.009)
1/  We estimate the modified equation dy  Bl(aldl) + B2(gmdm) + B3 [D * aldl] +
B4[D *  aMdm) + B5 *  D.  We then test the joint restriction that B1 =  B2 and
B3 =  B4. The F-Value of the test is reported  here.
33TABLE  5
Comparison  of OLS  and  vithin  Eutiuateal/
Estimating
Equation:  dy - Bo +  Bl (Eldl  +  £mdm) +  B2 [D ,  (1ldl  + amdm)J + B3  D
B1  B2
Vithin  Vithin
Sector  OLS  Estimate  OLS  Estimate  F-Value 2'
Grain processing  1.206  1.212  -.042  -.015  0.0
(.052)  (.052)  (.082)  (.090)
Food processing  .911  0.86  -.114  -.083  0.1
(.061)  (.069)  (.123)  (.141)
Other food  1.281  1.277  .065  .027  0.0
(.051)  (.053)  (.142)  (.150)
Textiles  1.136  1.137  -.125  -.139  0.0
(.055)  (.058)  (.086)  (.090)
Chemicals  1.068  1.044  -.029  -.021  0.0
(.036)  (.037)  (.070)  (.073)
Transport  1.027  1.038  .013  .022  0.5
(.038)  (.041)  (.079)  (.083)
Machinery  1.078  1.008  -.001  -.027  0.7
(.027)  (.026)  (.202)  (.118)
Wood products  1.055  1.039  -.051  -.100  0.0
(.029)  (.030)  (.070)  (.077)
Paper produicts  1.055  1.072  .179  .146  0.1
(.056)  (.056)  (.087)  (.087)
All Sectors  1.078  1.053  -.019  -.014  0.4
(.014)  (.014)  (.030)  (.031)
1/  Within estimates are computed by taking the deviations from firm  means over
time for all variables.
2/  Tests the restriction that the coefficients B1 and B2 are equal for the OLS
and within estimates.
34TABLE 6
Instrumntal  Variables Estimatesll
Est mating
Equation:  dy - Bo +  B1 (aldl  +  Lmd3) +  B2(D  (tldl  +  RMdm)) +  B3 I  D
F-'ralue  F-Value for  Overid
Sector  Bi  'l  B2 1/  for Bl-l  Bi+ B2-1  Test2 I
Grain processing  0.831  .444  0.3  3.6  8.2
(.305)  (.338)
Food processing  1.161  -.947  0.7  0.7  1.2
(.189)  (.480)
Other food  1.349  -.249  6.3  0.1  14.1
(.139)  (.319)
Textiles  1.333  -.487  1.8  1.3  3.8
(.252)  (.285)
Chemicals  1.299  .157  0.9  3.0  3.6
(.322)  (.417)
Transport  .816  .158  1.5  0.0  7.4
(.150)  (.202)
Machinery3/  1.251  -.199  2.6  0.0  1.5
(.154)  (.640)
Wood products  1.485  -.680  5.6  0.4  1.5
(.205)  (.348)
Paper products  1.004  .339  0.0  6.4  8.6
(.306)  (.334)
All Sectors  1.241  -.305  1.4  0.3  1.1
(.203)  (.232)
1/  Instruments are D; the  second  lag  of  the  nominal exchange rate; price
index for energy; the second lags  of employment,  materials, and the share
of debt in sales; and D interacted  with these 5 variables.
2/  The overidentification test gives  the  chi-square statistic for the hypo-
thesis that the instruments  are acce?ted  as valid.  The critical 5Z value
of the chi-square (9)  - 16.9.  A higher value indicates rejection of the
test.
3/  Instrument list excludes  interaction  of  D  and  1)  the price index for
energy, 2) the second lag of the nominal exchange rate.
35TABLE  7
IV  Estimates  with  no Restrictions  on the  Scale  Technology
Estimating  Equations dy-  Bo +  B1 d  +  B2(D  d  xz]  + 13  D + B d  k. 1 d
Overid
Sector  Bl 2/  B2  2/  B4 2/  Teat  3/
Grain  processing  .968  .410  .147  7.9
(.408)  (.346)  (.290)
Food  Processing  1.194  -.930  .085  1.1
(.254)  (.494)  (.423)
Other  food  .856  -. 316  -. 522  12.1
(.367)  (.321)  (.360)
Textiles  1.468  -. 513  .243  2.3
(.206)  (.453)  (.427)
Chemicals  1.306  .124  -. 093  3.3
(.327)  (.458)  (.511)
Transport  .720  .203  -. 159  6.4
(.193)  (.215)  (.191)
Machinery  1.138  .025  -.200  1.0
(.214)  (.699)  (.268)
Wood  products  1.468  -.513  .243  3.3
(.206)  (.453)  (.427)
Paper  products  .672  .450  -.332  8.2
(.482)  (.352)  (.377)
All sectors  1.314  -.353  .065  10.7
(.417)  (.336)  (.315)
1/  dx  - ldl +  £mdm
dk - dK/K
21  See  Table  6, footnotes  1/  and  3/,  for  instrument  list.
3/  The  overidentification  test gives  the  chi-square statistic  for  the
hypothesis  that  the  instruments  are  accepted  as valid. The  critical  52
value  of the  chi-square  (8)  a  15.5.
36TABUE  6
IV Eatimtes  Allowing  Mark-ups  to  Vary  Across
Fimrs  and  Over  Timle 1
Estimating  Equations:
(1)  dy  - Bo +  BldZ +  B2(D-dz3  +  5  *  D  +  34 [Sdx]
(2)  dy  - Bo + Bld4  + B2[D-ds]  +  BS  D +  34[S-dzJ  +  35[S-DdzJ
(1)  (2)
|1  34  81  34  B5
Grain  processing  .866  -. 697  .833  -. Oi  -. 940
(.329)  (1.090)  (.335)  (1.935)  (2.327)
Food  processing  1.212  -1.475  1.303  -4.092  3.986
(.234)  (3.644)  (.299)  (6.355)  (7.843)
Other  food  1.352  -. 022  1.418  -.491  1.425
(.229)  (1.293)  (.267)  (1.6C6)  (2.800)
Textiles  1.378  -. 727  1.405  -1.152  1.329
(.309)  (2.847)  (.334)  (3.477)  (6.154)
Chemicals  1.299  -. 275  1.299  -. 930  .738
(.323)  (2.098)  (.322)  (6.240)  (6.623)
Transport  .822  -. 377  .767  3.025  -4.084
(.171)  (4.929)  (.250) (11.990) (13.215)
Machinery  1.244  .270  1.052  7.849  -42.189
(.617)  (24.152)  (.756) (29.618) (70.081)
Wood  products  1.641  -6.045  1.631  -5.639  -1.382
(.255)  (5.409)  (.270)  (6.426) (11.864)
Paper  products  1.229  -2.332  1.199  -2.023  -.323
(.388)  (1.946)  (.975)  (9.478)  (9.684)
All  Sectors  1.116  1.441  1.186  .634  2.780
(.279)  (2.224)  (.318)  (2.753)  (5.111)
1/  See  table  6 for  instrument  list.
37TABLE 9
OLS and IV Estimates  Adjusting for Capacity Utilization
Estimating  Equations:
(1)  dy - Bo +  B1 ( 1dl  +  amdM)  +  B2(D'(aldl  +QmdM)] +  B3'D
(2)  dy - de =  Bo +  B1 (Qldl + amdm  (al+am)  de)
+  B2 [Di(aldl  +  Qmdm  (l+Qm)  de)] +  B3 'D
OLS  IV
Sector  (1)  (2)  (2)
B 1 B1 B2 B1 B2
Grain processing  1.222  1.173  .009  1.081  .220
(.081)  (.083)  (.104)  (.195)  (.235)
Fcod processing  .859  .970  -.222  1.243  -.694
(.091)  (.070)  (.120)  (.329)  (.423)
Other food  1.268  1.346  .054  1.741  -.474
(.048)  (.043)  (.087)  (.193)  (.304)
Textiles  1.119  1.082  -.186  1.165  -.439
(.067)  (.046)  (.081)  (.188)  (.268)
Chemicals  .996  1.050  .039  .878  .597
(.053)  (.035)  (.064)  (.195)  (.355)
Transport  1.059  1.108  .009  1.133  -.081
(.061)  (.049)  (.067)  (.143)  (.189)
Machinery  .964  .952  .043  1.168  -.748
(.032)  %.027)  (.185)  (.226)  (.795)
Wood products  1.167  1.152  .022  1.226  -.608
(.047)  (.046)  (.065)  (.169)  (.305)
Paper products  .939  .996  .254  .653  .807
(.086)  (.061)  (.090)  (.431)  (.458)
All sectors  1.058  1.060  .048  1.362  -.399
(.019)  (.015)  (.027)  (.181)  (.215)
1/  See table 6, footnotes 1/ and 3/ for instrument  list.
38TABLE 10
Sensitivity of TIP Estimates to  Assumption
of Perfect  Competition lp  - 1]
TFP - [112  Yt - ln Yt-1J - is  AL  (ln  Lt - ln Lt-1) +  1M  (ln  Mt - ln Mt-1)
+ (110  - iM  k  Z)  (la  Kt - ln Kt_l)]
Sector  TFP  TFP 2/
(p-1]  (Psi)
Pre  Post  Dif-  Pre  Post  Dif-
Reform  Reform  ference  Reform  Reform  ference
Grain processing  0.1  1.4  1.3  0.04  0.92  0.88
Food processing  1.4  0.9  -0.5  1.2  0.9  -0.3
Otbir food  0.5  1.3  0.8  -0.7  1.3  2.0
Textiles  0.4  -1.5  -1.9  0.5  -1.5  -2.0
Chemicals  1.3  3.6  2.3  0.90  0.88  -0.02
Transport  -1.3  1.7  3.0  -.5  1.5  2.0
Machinery  1.6  5.3  4.0  2.1  5.3  3.2
Wood products  .6  -3.4  -4.0  0.7  -3.4  -4.1
Paper products  -0.3  6.2  6.5  -0.3  6.7  7.0
All sectors  0.7  1.5  0.8  0.7  0.9  0.2
lj  This is the Tornquist index number formula for TFP, modified to allow for
imperfect competition and scale economies.  Labor and material shares aL
and aM are defined as follows:  aL - 1/2 (MLt  +  aLt-1)
aM  - 1/2  (aMt  +  aMt_,)
2\  Estimates for y  taken from Table 9.
39TABU  A.lI
Share of Ezports in Total Sales
Sector  1976-1984  1985-1987
(Z)  (Z)
Grain processing  4.3  4.3
Food processing  69.5  72.6
Other food  8.0  9.0
Textiles  17.0  10.0
Chemicals  20.7  22.4
Transport  6.6  6.2
Machinery  3.9  3-7
Wood products  43.2  41.0
Paper products  2.4  5.2
All sectors  18.2  19.7
40Table  A.2
GLS  Estimates  /
Estimating
Equations dy  - Bo + Bl (eldl  +  mdm) + B2[D  (eldl  +  andm)] +  33  D
Sector  Bl  B2  F-Value  2/
Grain  processing  1.208  -.041  0.0
(.052)  (.083)
Food  processing  .905  -.112  0.0
(.062)  (.125)
Textiles  1.135  -. 122  0.0
(.055)  (.086)
Chemicals  1.066  -.029  0.0
(.037)  (.071)
Transport  1.029  .013  0.0
(.039)  (.079)
Machinery  1.060  -.019  0.1
(.027)  (.203)
Wood  products  1.053  -. 055  0.0
(.029)  (.071)
Paper  products  1.059  .175  0.0
(.056)  (.088)
All sectors  1.072  -.016  0.0
(.014)  (.030)
1/  GLS  estimates  are  computed by  taking the  deviations  from  firm  means
over  time  for  all  variables,  given  by dyit  - ayi.  The  value  of a is
equal  to 1 - )7i,  where  02  - 2  an  2  or are  estimated e  n  ~aaresitd
V  + TiU&
from  between  and  within  residuals,  and  Ti is  the  number  of observations
for  each  ith  firm.
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